We consider a trader who aims to liquidate a large position in the presence of an arbitrageur who hopes to profit from the trader's activity. The arbitrageur is uncertain about the trader's position and learns from observed price fluctuations. This is a dynamic game with asymmetric information. We present an algorithm for computing perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior and conduct numerical experiments. Our results demonstrate that the trader's strategy differs significantly from one that would be optimal in the absence of the arbitrageur. In particular, the trader must balance the conflicting desires of minimizing price impact and minimizing information that is signaled through trading. Accounting for information signaling and the presence of strategic adversaries can greatly reduce execution costs.
Introduction
When buying or selling securities, value is lost through execution costs such as exchange fees, commissions, bid-ask spreads, and price impact. The latter can be dramatic and typically dominates other sources of execution cost when trading large blocks, when the security is thinly traded, or when there is an urgent demand for liquidity. Execution algorithms aim to reduce price impact by partitioning the quantity to be traded and placing trades sequentially. Growing recognition for the importance of execution has fueled an academic literature on the topic as well as the formation of specialized groups at investment banks and other organizations to offer execution services.
Optimal execution algorithms have been developed for a number of models. In the base model of Bertsimas and Lo [1] , a stock price nominally follows a discrete-time random walk and the market impact of a trade is permanent and linear in trade size. The authors establish that expected cost is minimized by an equipartitioning policy. This policy trades equal amounts over the time increments within the trading horizon. Further developments have led to optimal execution algorithms for models that incorporate price predictions [1] , bid-ask spreads and resilience [2, 3] , nonlinear price impact models [4, 5] , and risk aversion [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] .
The aforementioned results offer insight into how one should partition a block and sequence trades under various assumptions about market dynamics and objectives. The resulting algorithms, however, are unrealistic in that they exhibit predictable behavior. Such predictable behavior allows strategic adversaries, which we call arbitrageurs, to "front-run" trades and profit at the expense of increased execution cost. For example, consider liquidating a large block by an equipartitioning policy which sells an equal amount during each minute of a trading day. Trades early in the day generate abnormal price movements, allowing an observing arbitrageur to anticipate further liquidation. If the arbitrageur sells short and closes his position at the end of the day, he profits from expected price decreases. The arbitrageur's actions amplify price impact and therefore increase execution costs.
Several recent papers study game-theoretic models of execution in the presence of strategic arbitrageurs [11, 12, 13] . However, these models involve games with symmetric information, in which arbitrageurs know the position to be liquidated. In more realistic scenarios, this information would be the private knowledge of the trader, and the arbitrageurs would make inferences as to the trader's position based on observed market activity.
This type of information asymmetry is central to effective execution. The fact that his position is unknown to others allows the trader to greatly reduce execution costs. But to do so requires deliberate management of the signals he transmits by influencing prices. Further, the desire to minimize information signaling may be at odds with the desire to minimize price impact. A model through which such signaling can be studied must account for uncertainty among arbitrageurs and their ability to learn from observed price fluctuations. In this paper we formulate and study a simple model which we believe to be the first that meets this requirement.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We formulate the optimal execution problem as a dynamic game with asymmetric information. This game involves a trader and a single arbitrageur. Both agents are risk neutral, and market dynamics evolve according to a linear price impact model of Bertsimas and Lo [1] . The trader seeks to liquidate his position in a finite time horizon. The arbitrageur attempts to infer the position of the trader by observing market price movements, and seeks to exploit this information for profit.
2. We develop an algorithm that computes perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior. 3 . We demonstrate that the associated equilibrium strategies take on a surprisingly simple structure: 4. We present computational results that make several points about perfect Bayesian equilibrium in our model:
(a) In the presence of adversaries, there are significant potential benefits to employing perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies.
(b) Unlike strategies proposed based on prior models in the literature, which exhibit deterministic sequences of trades, trades in perfect Bayesian equilibrium respond to price fluctuations; the trader leverages these random outcomes to shade his activity.
(c) When the relative volume of the trader's activity is low, in equilibrium, the trader can ignore the presence of the arbitrageur and will equipartition to minimize price impact. Alternatively, when the relative volume is high, the trader will concentrate his trading activity in a short time interval so as to minimize signaling.
(d) The presence of the arbitrageur leads to a market surplus. That is, the trader's expected loss due to the arbitrageur's presence is larger than the expected profit of the arbitrageur. Hence, other market participants benefit from the arbitrageur's activity.
Beyond the immediate application to the optimal execution problem, the results in this paper also represent a contribution to the general theory of games with asymmetric information. Equilibrium in such games is notoriously difficult to compute. Typical games that have been considered are basic signaling games (see [14, Chapter 8] and the references therein), where the game has two periods and the private information takes the form of a binary-valued "type". In contrast, the game considered here has an arbitrary discrete time horizon, and the private information (the position of the trader) is a continuous value.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our problem formulation. Section 3 discusses how perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this model is characterized by a dynamic program. A practical algorithm for computing perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior is developed in Section 4. This algorithm is applied in computational studies, for which results are presented and interpreted in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 makes some closing remarks and suggests directions for future work. Proofs of all theoretical results are presented in the appendix.
Problem Formulation
We consider a game that evolves over a finite horizon in discrete time steps t = 0, . . . , T .
There are two players: a trader and an arbitrageur. The trader begins with a position x 0 ∈ R in a stock, which he must liquidate by time T . We denote his position at each time t by x t . The trader requires that his final position x T be zero. The arbitrageur begins with a position y 0 . We denote his position at each time t by y t . He requires that y T be zero.
The price of the stock evolves according to
where u t is the quantity purchased by the trader and v t is the quantity purchased by the arbitrageur. The sequence { t } is IID with t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), for some σ > 0. This noise sequence represents the random and exogenous fluctuations of market prices. We assume that the trading decisions u t and v t are made at time t − 1, and executed at the price p t at time t. The positions evolve according to
and
The information structure of the game is as follows. The dynamics of the game (in particular, the parameters λ and σ ) and the common time horizon T are mutually known.
From the perspective of the arbitrageur, the initial position x 0 of the trader is unknown.
Further, the trader's actions u t are not directly observed. However, the arbitrageur begins with a prior distribution φ 0 on the trader's initial position x 0 . As the game evolves over time, the arbitrageur observes the price changes ∆p t . The arbitrageur updates his beliefs based on these price movements, at any time t maintaining a posterior distribution φ t of the trader's current position x t , based on his observation of the history of the game up to and including time t.
From the trader's perspective, we assume that everything is known. This is motivated by the fact that the arbitrageur's initial position y 0 will typically be zero and the trader can go through the same inference process as the arbitrageur to arrive at the prior distribution φ 0 . Given a prescribed policy of the form described below for the arbitrageur (for example, in equilibrium), the trader can subsequently reconstruct the arbitrageur's positions and beliefs over time, given the public observations of market price movements. We do make the assumption, however, that any deviations on the part of the arbitrageur from his prescribed policy will not mislead the trader. In our context, this assumption is important for tractability. We discuss the situation where this assumption is relaxed, and the trader does not have perfect knowledge of the arbitrageur's positions and beliefs, in Section 6.
The trader's purchases are governed by a policy, which is a sequence of functions π = {π 1 , . . . , π T }. Each function π t+1 maps x t , y t , and φ t , to a decision u t+1 at time t. We consider only trader policies for which π T (x T −1 , y T −1 , φ T −1 ) = −x T −1 ; i.e., policies that result in liquidation. We denote the set of trader policies by Π. Similarly, the arbitrageur follows a policy ψ = {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ T }. Each function ψ t+1 maps y t and φ t to a decision v t+1 made at time t. We restrict attention to arbitrageur policies for which ψ T (y T −1 , φ T −1 ) = −y T −1 . We denote the set of arbitrageur policies by Ψ.
Note that we are restricting ourselves to policies that are Markovian in the sense that the state of the game at time t is summarized for the trader and arbitrageur by the tuples (x t , y t , φ t ) and (y t , φ t ), respectively, and that each player's action is only a function of his state. Further, we are assuming that the policies are pure strategies in the sense that, as a function of the player's state, the actions are deterministic. In general, one may wish to consider policies which determine actions as a function of the entire history of the game up to a given time, and allow randomization over the choice of action. Our assumptions will exclude equilibria from this more general class. However, it will be the case that for the equilibria that we do find, arbitrary deviations that are history dependent and/or randomized will not be profitable.
If the arbitrageur applies an action v t and assumes the trader uses a policyπ ∈ Π, then upon observation of ∆p t at time t, the arbitrageur's beliefs are updated in a Bayesian fashion according to
for all measurable sets S ⊂ R. Note that ∆p t here is an observed numerical value which could have resulted from a trader action u t =π t (x t−1 , y t−1 , φ t−1 ). As such, the trader is capable of misleading the arbitrageur to distort his posterior distribution φ t .
We consider a profit to be a change of book value, which is the sum of a player's cash position and asset position, valued at the prevailing market price. Hence, the profit generated by the trader and arbitrageur through their trades u t+1 and v t+1 are
respectively. If the trader uses policy π and the arbitrageur uses policy ψ and assumes the trader uses policyπ, the trader expects profits
over times τ = t + 1, . . . , T . Here, the subscripts indicate that trades are executed based on π and ψ, while beliefs are updated based onπ. Similarly,
over times τ = t + 1, . . . , T . Here, the conditioning in the expectation implicitly assumes that x t is distributed according to φ t .
Note that −U π,(ψ,π) t (x 0 , y 0 , φ 0 ) is the trader's expected execution cost. For practical choices of π, ψ, andπ, we expect this quantity to be positive since the trader is likely to sell his shares for less than the initial price. To compress notation, for any π, ψ, and t, let
As a solution concept, we consider perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is a refinement of Nash equilibrium that rules out implausible outcomes by requiring subgame perfection and consistency with Bayesian belief updates. In particular, we will refer to π ∈ Π as a best
for all t, x t , y t , and φ t . Further, we will refer to ψ ∈ Ψ as a best response to π ∈ Π if
for all t, y t , and φ t . We define perfect Bayesian equilibrium, specialized to our context, as follows:
1. π * is a best response to (ψ * , π * );
2. ψ * is a best response to π * .
In a PBE, each player's action at time t depends on positions x t and/or y t and the distribution φ t . These arguments, especially the distribution, make computation and representation of a PBE challenging. We will settle for a more modest goal. We compute PBE actions only for cases where φ t is Gaussian. When the initial distribution φ 0 is Gaussian and players employ these PBE policies, subsequent distributions φ t are also Gaussian. As such, computation of PBE policies over the restricted domain is sufficient to characterize equilibrium behavior given any initial conditions involving a Gaussian prior. To formalize our approach, we now define a solution concept.
2)) holds for all t, x t , y t , and Gaussian φ t . A Gaussian perfect
Bayesian equilibrium is a pair (π * , ψ * ) ∈ Π × Ψ of policies such that 1. π * is a Gaussian best response to (ψ * , π * );
2. ψ * is a Gaussian best response to π * ; 3. if φ 0 is Gaussian and arbitrageur assumes the trader uses π * then, independent of the true actions of the trader, φ 1 , . . . , φ T −1 are Gaussian.
Note that when Gaussian PBE policies are used and the prior φ 0 is Gaussian, the system behavior is indistinguishable from PBE since the policies produce actions that concur with PBE policies at all states that are visited.
Dynamic Programming Analysis
In this section, we develop abstract dynamic programming algorithms for computing PBE and Gaussian PBE. We also discuss structural properties of associated value functions.
The dynamic programming recursion relies on the computation of equilibria for single-stage games, and we also discuss the existence of such equilibria. The algorithms of this section are not implementable, but their treatment motivates the design of a practical algorithm that will be presented in the next section.
Stage-Wise Decomposition
We will decompose the process of computing a PBE and corresponding value functions into single-stage problems via a dynamic programming recursion. We begin by defining some notation. For each π t , ψ t , and u t , we define a dynamic programming operator
for all U , where
, and φ t results from Bayesian updating given that the arbitrageur assumes the trader tradesπ t (x t−1 , y t−1 , φ t−1 )
while the trader actually trades u t . In addition, for each π t and v t , we define a dynamic
for all V , where y t = y t−1 + v t , u t = π t (x t−1 , y t−1 , φ t−1 ), x t−1 is distributed according to the belief φ t−1 , and φ t results from Bayesian updating given that the arbitrageur correctly assumes the trader trades u t .
Consider Algorithm 1. It is easy to see that, so long as Step 3 is carried out successfully each time it is invoked, the algorithm produces a PBE (π * , φ * ) along with value functions
. However, the algorithm is not implementable. For starters, the functions π * t , ψ * t , U * t−1 , and V * t−1 , which must be computed and stored, have infinite domains. This can not be done on a computer.
Algorithm 1 PBE Solver
1: Initialize the terminal value functions by setting, for all x T −1 , y T −1 , and φ T −1 ,
Compute (π * t , ψ * t ) such that for all x t−1 , y t−1 , and φ t−1 ,
Compute the value functions at the previous time step by setting, for all x t−1 , y t−1 , and φ t−1 ,
5: end for
Quasilinear Policies
Given a distribution φ t , define
, and ρ t ≡ λσ t /σ .
Since λ and σ are constants, ρ t is simply a scaled version of the standard deviation σ t .
The ratio λ/σ acts as a normalizing constant that accounts for the informativeness of observations. The reason we consider this scaling is that it highlights certain invariants across problem instances. In Section 5.2, we will interpret the value of ρ 0 as the relative volume of the trader's activity in the marketplace.
We will consider restricting attention to a class of policies that are indexed by a few parameters.
Definition 3.
A function π t is quasilinear if there are coefficients a ρ t−1
x,t and a ρ t−1 y,t , which are functions of ρ t−1 , such that
for all x t−1 , y t−1 , and φ t−1 . A function ψ t is quasilinear if there is a coefficient b
which is a function of ρ t−1 , such that
We will also refer to a policy as quasilinear if component functions associated with times 1, . . . , T − 1 are quasilinear.
Note that quasilinear policies have a particularly intuitive structure. For the arbitrageur, at each time t, a quasilinear policy is a linear function of y t−1 + µ t−1 . This quantity can be interpreted as the arbitrageur's estimate of the total market overhang at time t − 1, that is, the number of shares outstanding which must be liquidated by time T . A quasilinear policy for the trader at time t, in addition, depends linearly on the quantity x t−1 − µ t−1 . This is the error of the arbitrageur's estimate of the trader's position, that is, the private knowledge of the trader.
By restricting attention to quasilinear policies and Gaussian beliefs, we can apply an algorithm similar to that presented in the previous section to compute a Gaussian PBE. In Initialize the terminal value functions by setting, for all x T −1 , y T −1 , and Gaussian φ T −1 ,
Compute quasilinear (π * t , ψ * t ) such that for all x t−1 , y t−1 , and Gaussian φ t−1 ,
Compute the value functions at the previous time step by setting, for all x t−1 , y t−1 , and Gaussian φ t−1 ,
For the remainder of this paper, we will focus on computation of quasilinear-Gaussian PBE, and as such, we will restrict attention to Gaussian beliefs, with all policies and value functions defined only over this restricted domain.
Value Function Decomposition
Value functions computed by Algorithm 2 exhibit special structure that simplifies their representation. We now define the form of this special structure. 
for all y t and φ t .
It is clear that U * T −1 and V * T −1 are TQD/AQD. The following theorem captures how TQD and AQD structure are retained through the recursion of Algorithm 2.
presenting results on best responses to quasilinear policies. The first asserts that if ψ t and π t are quasilinear then there is a quasilinear best-response π t in the single-stage game.
Theorem 3. If U t is TQD, ψ t is quasilinear, andπ t is quasilinear, then there exists a quasilinear π t such that
for all x t−1 , y t−1 , and Gaussian φ t−1 , so long as the optimization problem is bounded.
Similarly, if π t is quasilinear then there is a quasilinear best-response ψ t in the single-stage game.
Theorem 4. If V t is AQD and π t is quasilinear then there exists a quasilinear ψ t such that
for all y t−1 and Gaussian φ t−1 , so long as the optimization problem is bounded.
Based on these results, if the trader (arbitrageur) assumes that the arbitrageur (trader) uses a quasilinear policy then it suffices for the trader (arbitrageur) to restrict himself to quasilinear policies. Though not a proof of existence, this observation that the set of quasilinear policies is closed under the operation of best response motivates an aim to compute quasilinearGaussian PBE. for every ρ t > 0 and t = 0, . . . , T − 2. These coefficients parameterize quasilinear-Gaussian PBE policies and corresponding value functions. Note that the output depends on λ and σ only through ρ t . Hence, given any λ and σ , the algorithm obtains the same coefficients.
Dependence on Problem Data
This means that the algorithm need only be executed once to obtain solutions for all choices of λ and σ .
Algorithm
The previous section presented abstract algorithms and results that lay the groundwork for the development of a practical algorithm which we will present in this section. We begin by discussing a parsimonious representation of policies.
Representation of Policies
Consider a quasilinear-Gaussian PBE (π * , ψ * ). Since π * t and ψ * t are quasilinear, they can be written as
for all x t−1 , y t−1 , and φ t−1 . Here, the coefficients are deterministic functions of ρ t−1 . For a fixed value of ρ t−1 , the coefficients can be stored as three numerical values. However, it is not feasible to simultaneously store coefficients associated with all possible values of ρ t−1 .
Fortunately, as established in the following result, the trader's policy π * and the initial value ρ 0 determine subsequent values of ρ t .
Theorem 5. If φ t−1 is Gaussian, and the arbitrageur assumes that the trader's policyπ t is quasilinear witĥ
y,t (y t−1 + µ t−1 ), then ρ t evolves according to
In particular, ρ t is a deterministic function of ρ t−1 .
It follows that for a fixed value of ρ 0 , over the relevant portion of its domain, a quasilinearGaussian PBE can be encoded in terms of 3(T − 1) numerical values. We will design an algorithm that aims to compute these 3(T − 1) parameters, which we will denote by a x,t , a y,t and b y,t , for t = 1, . . . , T − 1. Note that these parameters allow us to determine PBE actions at all visited states, so long as the initial value of ρ 0 is fixed.
Searching for Equilibrium Variances
The parameters a x,t , a y,t , and b y,t characterize quasilinear-Gaussian PBE policies restricted to the sequence ρ 0 , . . . , ρ T −1 generated in the quasilinear-Gaussian PBE. We do not know in advance what this sequence will be, and as such, our algorithm will simultaneously compute this sequence alongside the policy parameters. is indeed equal to ρ 0 . Since information accumulates, it is natural to conjecture that in a quasilinear-Gaussian PBE, each ρ t is monotonically increasing in ρ t−1 , and therefore, ρ T −1 is monotonically increasing in ρ 0 . This motivates the bisection search: if a choice ofρ T −1 leads to a valueρ 0 > ρ 0 , the value should be reduced, and vice versa. The search begins with upper and lower bounds of 0 and min(ρ 0 , 1); it is not hard to establish that ρ T −1 is within these bounds. This search procedure is reminiscent of the work of Kyle [15] , in a different context.
Note that
Step 7 of the algorithm treatsρ t−1 as a free variable that is solved alongside the policy parameters a x,t , a y,t , and b y,t . These variables can be computed through solving a cubic equation, as discussed in Appendix B. Algorithm 3 is implementable and we use it in computational studies presented in the next section.
Algorithm 3 Quasilinear-Gaussian PBE Solver with Variance Search
Initialize
for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1 do
7:
Computeρ t−1 and quasilinear (π * t , ψ * t ) such that for all x t−1 , y t−1 , and Gaussian φ t−1 with variance
Compute the value functions at the previous time step by setting, for all x t−1 , y t−1 , and Gaussian φ t−1 with variance (ρ t−1 σ /λ) 2 ,
end for 10:
ρ T −1 ←ρ T −1 12:
ρ T −1 ←ρ T −1
14:
end if 15: end while
In this section, we present computational results generated using Algorithm 3. In Section 5.1, we introduce two alternative policies, the equipartitioning policy and the minimum revelation policy. These are intuitive polices which will serve as a basis of comparison to the quasilinearGaussian PBE policy. In Section 5.2, we discuss the importance of the parameter ρ 0 ≡ λσ 0 /σ in the qualitative behavior of the PBE policy and interpret ρ 2 0 as a measure of the "relative volume" of the trader's activity in the marketplace. In Section 5.3, we discuss the relative performance of the policies from the perspective of the execution cost of the trader.
Here, we demonstrate experimentally that the PBE policy can offer substantial benefits.
In Section 5.4, we examine the signaling that occurs through price movements. Finally, in Section 5.5, we highlight the fact that the PBE policy is dynamic, and seeks to exploit exogenous market fluctuations in order to minimize execution costs.
Alternative Policies
In order to understand the behavior of quasilinear-Gaussian PBE policies, we first define two alternative policies for the trader for the purpose of comparison. In the absence of an arbitrageur, it is optimal for the trader to minimize execution costs by partitioning his position into T equally sized blocks and liquidating them sequentially over the T time periods, as established in [1] . We call the resulting policy π EQ an equipartitioning policy. It is defined by
for all t, x t−1 , y t−1 , and φ t−1 .
Alternatively, the trader may wish to liquidate his position in a way so as to reveal as little information as possible to the arbitrageur. Clearly, trading during the final time period T reveals no relevant information to the arbitrageur. It is further true that trading during the penultimate time period T − 1 reveals no useful information to the arbitrageur. This is because the arbitrageur is constrained to liquidate his remaining holdings at time T , hence the arbitrageur's decision at time T is not influenced by his belief φ T −1 . We define the minimum revelation policy π MR to be a policy that efficiently exploits these facts by liquidating the trader's position evenly across only the last two time periods. That is,
Relative Volume
As we observed in Section 4.1, quasilinear-Gaussian PBE policies are determined as a function of the composite parameter ρ 0 ≡ λσ 0 /σ . In order to interpret this parameter, consider the dynamics of price changes,
Here, we interpreted t as the exogenous, random component of price changes. Alternatively, we can imagine the random component of price changes are arising from the price impact of "noise traders". Denote by z t the total order flow from noise traders at time t, and consider a model where
If σ = λσ z , these two models are equivalent. In that case,
In other words, we can interpret ρ 0 as the ratio of the uncertainty of the total volume of the trader's activity to the per period volume of noise trading. As such, we refer to ρ 0 as the relative volume.
We shall see in the following sections that, qualitatively, the performance and behavior of PBE policies are determined by the magnitude of ρ 0 . In the high relative volume regime, when ρ 0 is large, either the initial position uncertainty σ 0 is very large or the volatility σ z of the noise traders is very small. In these cases, from the perspective of the arbitrageur, the trader's activity contributes a significant informative signal which can be decoded in the context of less significant exogenous random noise. Hence, the trader's activity early in the time horizon reveals significant information which can be exploited by the arbitrageur.
Thus, it may be better for the trader to defer his liquidation until the end of the time horizon.
Alternatively, in the low relative regime, when ρ 0 is small, the arbitrageur cannot effectively distinguish the activity of the trader from the noise traders in the market. Hence, the trader is free to distribute his trades across the time horizon so as to minimize market impact, without fear of front-running by the arbitrageur.
Policy Performance
In this section, we will compare how various policies for the trader perform. 
Alternatively, if the trader liquidates his entire position immediately, the expected profit
We define the trader's normalized profitŪ (π, ψ) to be the ratiō
Similarly, the arbitrageur's normalized profitV (π, ψ) is defined to bē
Given a quasilinear-Gaussian PBE (π * , ψ * ), since the value function U π * ,ψ * 0 is TQD, we Similarly, given the equipartitioning policy π EQ , define ψ EQ to be the optimal response of the arbitrageur to the trader's policy π EQ . This best response policy can be computed by solving the linear-quadratic control problem corresponding to (2.2), via dynamic programming. Using a similar argument as above, it is easy to see thatŪ (π EQ , ψ EQ ) and V (π EQ , ψ EQ ) are also functions of the parameter ρ 0 .
Finally, given the minimum revelation policy π MR , define ψ MR to be the optimal response of the arbitrageur to the trader's policy π MR . It can be shown that, when y 0 = 0 and µ 0 = 0, the best response of the arbitrageur to the minimum revelation policy is to do nothing-since no information is revealed by the trader in a useful fashion, there is no opportunity to front-run. Hence,
In Figure 1 , the relative profit of the various policies are plotted as functions of the relative volume ρ 0 , for a time horizon T = 20. In all scenarios, as one might expect, the trader's profit is negative while the arbitrageur's profit is positive. In all cases, the trader's profit under the PBE policy dominates that under either the equipartitioning policy or the minimum revelation policy. This difference is significant in moderate to high relative volume regimes.
In the high relative volume regime, the equipartitioning policy fairs particularly badly from the perspective of the trader, performing a up to a factor of 2 worse than the PBE policy.
This effect becomes more pronounced over longer time horizons. The minimum revelation policy performs about as well as the PBE policy. Asymptotically as ρ 0 ↑ ∞, these policies offer equivalent performance in the sense thatŪ (π * , ψ * ) ↑Ū (π MR , ψ MR ) = 3/4.
On the other hand, in the low relative volume regime, the equipartitioning policy and the PBE policy perform comparably. Indeed, define ψ 0 by ψ 0 t ≡ 0 for all t (that is, no trading by the arbitrageur). In the absence of an arbitrageur, equipartitioning is the optimal policy for the trader, and backward recursion can be used to show that
Asymptotically as
when the relative volume is low, the effect of the arbitrageur becomes negligible when ρ 0 is sufficiently small.
Examining Figure 1 , it is clear that, for any given pair of policies, the magnitude of the normalized loss of the trader exceeds the normalized profit of the arbitrageur. The difference in these two quantities can be interpreted as a benefit to the other participants (π EQ , ψ 0 ) in the market. Define the market surplus to be the quantitȳ
This is the difference between the normalized profit of the trader in the absence of the arbitrageur, under the optimal equipartitioning policy, and the combined normalized profits of the trader and arbitrageur in equilibrium. The market surplus measures the benefit of the arbitrageur's presence to the other participants of the system. Note that this benefit is positive, and it is most significant in the high relative volume regime.
Signaling
An important aspect of the PBE policy is that it accounts for information conveyed through price movements. In order to understand this feature, we define the relative uncertainty to be the standard deviation of the arbitrageur's belief of the trader's decision at time t, relative to that of the belief at time 0; i.e., the ratio σ t /σ 0 . By considering the evolution of relative uncertainty over time for the PBE policy versus the equipartitioning and minimum 
Thus, relative uncertainty at time t gives a measure of the size of the trader's outstanding position at that time, in a root-mean-squared sense.
Under the PBE policy, the evolution of the relative uncertainty σ t /σ 0 over time is deterministic and depends only on the parameter ρ 0 . This is because of the fact that σ t /σ 0 = ρ t /ρ 0 and the results in Section 4.1. Under the equipartitioning policy, the relative uncertainty decreases linearly, according to
Under the minimum revelation policy, the relative uncertainty decays only over the final two time steps, according to
In Figure 3 , we can see the evolution of the relative uncertainty of the PBE policy, for different values of ρ 0 , as compared to the equipartitioning and minimum revelation policies.
In the low relative volume regime, the relative uncertainty of the PBE policy evolves very similarly to that of the equipartitioning policy, decaying almost linearly. In the high relative volume regime, almost very little information is revealed until close to the end of the trading period. These observations are consistent with our results from Section 5.3. 
Dynamic Trading
One important feature of the PBE policy is that it is dynamic and exhibits complex behavior that is market dependent. The quantities traded depend on the random exogenous fluctuations of the market. Indeed, the trader may seek to exploit these fluctuations so as to minimize execution costs. This is in contrast to the equipartitioning and minimum revelation policies, which are deterministic.
We can observe this dynamic behavior as follows: define the random variable
The variable ∆ is the cumulative exogenous movement of the market over the trading horizon. Definex
These quantities are, respectively, the expectation of the trader's position, the arbitrageur's position, and the arbitrageur's mean belief, conditioned on a particular level of cumulative market movement. By conditioning on the variable ∆, we can explore the most likely behavior of the system under various market scenarios. Figure 4 plots the evolution of (x t ,ȳ t ,μ t ) under such several scenarios, given the param-
(Here, we use values for λ, σ , and T suggested in [1] .) Note that, in this instance,
That is, the arbitrageur's initial mean estimate is incorrect.
In Figure 4 (a), we see a neutral market scenario, where ∆ = 0. Note that, since ρ 0 = 40, the system is in a high relative volume regime. Hence, the trader attempts to conceal his true position and trades only minimally prior to the end of the time horizon.
In Figure 4 (b), we see a 2 standard deviation up market scenario, where ∆ = 2σ √ T .
Here, the exogenous upward movement of the market leads the arbitrageur to believe that the trader is short the stock, when, in fact, the trader is long. The trader then anticipates buying on the part of the arbitrageur, and seeks to exploit this by increasing his position.
In Figure 4 (c), we see a 2 standard deviation down market scenario, where ∆ = −2σ √ T .
In this case, the arbitrageur assumes that the downward movement of the market is due to selling on the part of the trader, and attempts to front-run future selling. The trader is thus forced to liquidate his position faster than in the other scenarios.
Conclusion
Our it is optimal to trade equal amounts over each time period, which corresponds to a policy that is linear in x t−1 . The difference in the PBE policy stems from its accounting of the arbitrageur's inference process. In particular, the policy reduces information revealed to the arbitrageur by delaying trades, takes advantage of situations where the arbitrageur has been misled by unusual market activity, and occasionally places trades intended to mislead the arbitrageur.
Our model represents a starting point for the study of game theoretic behavior in trade execution. It has an admittedly simple structure, and this allows for a tractable analysis that highlights the importance of information signaling. There are a number of extensions to this model that are possible, however, and that warrant further discussion:
1. (Risk Aversion) We assume that both the trader and arbitrageur are risk-neutral. Finally, beyond the immediate context of our model, there are many directions worth exploring. One important avenue is to factor data beyond price into the execution strategy.
For example, volume data may play a significant role in the arbitrageur's inference, in which case it should also influence execution decisions. Limit order book data may also be relevant.
Developing tractable models that account for such data remains a challenge. One initiative to incorporate limit order book data into the decision process is presented in [16] .
A Proofs Theorem 1. If φ t−1 is Gaussian,π t is quasilinear, and the arbitrageur assumes that the trader tradesπ t (x t−1 , y t−1 , φ t−1 ), then φ t is Gaussian.
Proof. Suppose that
y,t y t−1 ,
x,t . Set (K t−1 , h t−1 ) to be the information form parameters for the Gaussian distribution φ t−1 , so that
Define φ + t−1 to be the distribution of x t−1 conditioned on all information seen by the arbitrageur at times up to and including t. That is,
where ∆p t is the price change observed at time t. By Bayes' rule, this distribution has
y,t y t−1 +â
Thus, φ + t−1 is a Gaussian distribution, with variance
, and mean
Now, note that
Then, φ t is also a Gaussian distribution, with variance
y,t (y t−1 + µ t−1 ) +â
In order to prove Theorems 2-4, it is necessary to explicitly evaluate the operator F (ψt,πt) ut applied to quadratic functions of (x t , y t , µ t ) and the operator G πt vt applied to quadratic functions of (y t , µ t ). The following lemma is helpful for this purpose, as it provides expressions for the expectation of µ t and µ 2 t under various distributions.
Lemma 1.
Assume that the the quasilinear policies ψ t and π t are defined so that
If the trader uses the policy π * t and the arbitrageur uses the policy ψ * , we have
y,t (y t−1 + µ t−1 ),
Using these facts, and (A.3d)-(A.3f) from Lemma 1, we can explicitly compute
where
Therefore, V * t−1 is AQD. Similarly, we can check that U * t−1 is TQD.
Proof. Suppose that [ λ(u t + v t )x t−1 + U t (x t , y t , φ t ) | x t−1 , y t−1 , φ t−1 ] .
It is easily checked that F (ψt,πt) ut U t (x t−1 , y t−1 , φ t−1 ) is quadratic in u t . Moreover, the coefficient of u 2 t is independent of (x t−1 , y t−1 , µ t−1 ) while the coefficient of u t is linear in (x t−1 , y t−1 , µ t−1 ). Therefore, the optimizing u * t is linear in (x t−1 , y t−1 , µ t−1 ). The value of u * t can be explicitly computed as Clearly, u * t is quasilinear. y,t (y t−1 + µ t−1 ).
If the arbitrageur takes the action v t and assumes that the trader uses the policy π t , we have
x,t (x t−1 − µ t−1 ) + a ρ t−1 y,t (y t−1 + µ t−1 ),
Using these facts, and (A.3d)-(A.3f) from Lemma 1, we can explicitly compute It is easily checked that G πt vt V t (y t−1 , φ t−1 ) is quadratic in v t . Moreover, the coefficient of v 2 t is independent of (y t−1 , µ t−1 ) while the coefficient of v t is linear in (y t−1 , µ t−1 ). Therefore, the optimizing v * t is linear in (y t−1 , µ t−1 ). It may be the case that it is impossible to satisfy all of the conditions. In this case, we assume that the value ofρ t was set too high, and that there does not exist an equilibrium with variance (ρ t σ /λ) 2 at time t. Therefore, we escape from the loop immediately and lower the guess of ρ T −1 . Equivalently, we set ρ T −1 ← (ρ T −1 + ρ T −1 )/2.
We resume the loop with this new upper bound.
